In February 2026, Deputy High Court Judge Eardley KC, sitting in the King’s Bench Division, refused an application for an interim injunction in a claim for libel, malicious falsehood and harassment involving alleged blackmail and a defamatory website.  The decision in Read v Claudio di Giovanni & Ors [2026] EWHC 243 (KB) (9 February 2026) is an important reminder of just how high the bar is in obtaining interim injunctive relief to restrain publication in libel and privacy cases, and the importance of taking action promptly.

Although the court considered that the claimant was likely to establish at trial that the first and second defendants were responsible for the website and threatening messages (and where the Judge was not making findings of fact), the application for urgent relief failed on multiple grounds. The judgment explores the application of section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”), the “serious harm” threshold in defamation, and whether there existed a reasonable expectation of privacy for a misuse of private information claim.

Brief summary of the facts

The claimant, Nikoletta Read, brought claims in libel, malicious falsehood, and harassment arising out of what she claims is conduct amounting to online blackmail and a smear campaign.  The claimant issued a claim against two known defendants and three sets of “persons unknown”.  The underlying facts of the claim relate to an introduction by the claimant of the first defendant to Mr Farhan. The claimant’s evidence was that this was no more than a “friendly introduction made in good faith” to assist with a technical issue involving a blocked Stripe payment account and that her role was nothing more than that of an innocent introducer.

A financial dispute then followed between the defendants and Mr Farhan.

Thereafter, the claimant alleges that (1) she received blackmail threats from an unknown number referring to a “situation connected to Mr Farhan” and threatening to bring matters to public attention if she did not respond and (2) a website appeared containing allegations that she was a co-conspirator in a fraud with Mr Farhan, under the headline “How we were scammed by Nikole Read… A warning for entrepreneurs”. The website alleged that she used her company as a facade for a scam with Mr Farhan. It published private WhatsApp messages and photographs of the claimant.  The claimant’s evidence is that the website was altered several times in the period October 2024 to April 2025, with the Court noting that these appeared to be minor textual editing rather than the addition or uploading of new material.   The claimant’s evidence was that some of those changes included adding her full name, to make her more identifiable.

The second defendant denied involvement in creating the website but maintained that the allegations were true.  The first and third to fifth defendants did not appear and were not represented in the hearing.

The application for an interim injunction

The claimant applied for an interim injunction (click here to read more about interim injunctions: Injunction Relief - JMW Solicitors) to restrain the defendants from publishing any private or defamatory material about her; operating or updating the website; and making financial demands or threats. The draft order also sought a mandatory injunction requiring the website to be taken down.

The application failed on the following grounds.

1. Evidential deficiencies

An application for an interim injunction involves a claimant asking the Court to grant interim, temporary relief pending trial and before the Court has heard and considered all of the available evidence and potentially also having had the benefit of oral evidence from the parties and witnesses.  It therefore involves the Court carrying out a careful balancing of the rights of the claimant that may be infringed and any continuing harm, against a defendant’s rights including freedom of expression. 

In cases engaging Article 10 ECHR, the right to freedom of expression, the Court will consider section 12(3) HRA that requires a claimant to show that they are “likely to establish” at trial that publication should not be allowed. In Read, the Court held that the claimant had not demonstrated that she was likely to succeed at trial in the underlying claims to the degree required to justify an interim injunction being granted. This was fatal to the libel and misuse of private information aspects of the claim.

The judgment underscores the importance of a claimant considering and taking legal advice on the evidence put before the Court to persuade that it is appropriate to grant an interim injunction. 

Under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation. The Judge commented on a “paucity of information” about the extent and reach of the publication, the identity of those who had viewed the website, and the website’s prominence. Importantly, the claimant failed to identify any concrete adverse commercial or social consequences resulting from third parties reading the website, and had not explained in her evidence what her business is or how it had been harmed.

In defamation claims, interim injunction remain rare. The court will not restrain publication merely because a claim appears arguable; the claimant must show that a defence is not realistically arguable.  The judge observed that the so called rule in Bonnard v Perryman may present an additional obstacle or hurdle to the grant of a libel injunction. The longstanding principle is that where a defendant indicates an intention to justify the publication by truth or another recognised defence, and offers a credible basis for that assertion, the court will not grant interim restraint unless it is clear that the defence is bound to fail.

For the malicious falsehood claim, the claimant failed to provide detail to explain the nature or extent of her alleged financial loss. A bare assertion, without cogent evidence of special damage (or likelihood of it), lacked the necessary foundation.

Turning to the misuse of private information claim, the claimant also argued that the publication of WhatsApp messages and photographs constituted a misuse of her private information. The Court was not persuaded that the material crossed the threshold. The photographs were described as being akin to social media posts and there was no suggestion that her devices had been unlawfully accessed.  Business discussions over text were similarly unlikely to fall within the realm of private life.   The Judge commented that the claimant’s evidence that matters published on the website were known only to her and the first and second defendants, and Mr Farhan, supported her case of likely authorship of the website but not an argument on privacy.

The case is an important reminder to consider whether the materials complained about meet the relevant threshold to create a reasonable expectation of privacy when a Court is asked to balance Article 8 and Article 10 rights, in light of the section 12(3) hurdle.

As to harassment, the Judge commented that the blackmail demands combined with the setting up of the website in her own name and “devoted to attacking her” may well amount to a course of conduct but he was not satisfied of a present threat or risk of the harassment continuing to warrant the granting of interim relief. 

Finally, the claimant had not provided full Particulars of Claim and had placed little substantive evidence before the court.  The Judge commented that he was only able to act on the evidence presented to him and before the Court, but that the claimant’s approach created problems for her.

2. Delay

A significant factor undermining the application was delay.  

The claimant first applied for an injunction on 21 October 2025, more than 1 year after the blackmail demands and discovery of the website.  By that point, most of the damage had likely already occurred.  The claimant had been unable to persuade the Court that it was appropriate to grant the interim relief.

Importantly, whilst this meant that the claimant’s application for an interim injunction was unsuccessful, delay does not prevent a claimant being compensated in monetary damages for any resulting harm.  The Judge commented that the decision on the interim application did not mean that the claim would fail at trial, but that the claimant would need to provide the court with more detailed evidence and a proper particularisation of the claim.

Take aways

The decision in Read is a helpful reminder of the importance of taking legal advice promptly on becoming aware of what you may feel is an attack on your reputation or character.  Delay, and a failure to properly evidence the harm caused or potential harm and how the relevant legal thresholds are satisfied, may prove fatal in an application for an interim injunction.

This blog was co-authored by Rebecca Young and Sophie Connery.