Interim Applications in Financial Remedy Proceedings
Pauline McNamara and Megan Clarke represented the respondent in the recent judgment in AGS v RKS [2026] EWFC 104 (B) instructing Samatha Hillas KC.
This case is an important reminder that the Family Court will closely scrutinise interim financial remedy applications where the underlying claim is weak, disclosure is deficient, and the proceedings appear intertwined with attempts to shield or recapture assets affected by criminal confiscation proceedings.
From the respondent’s perspective, the decision is notable for its careful treatment of three recurring themes in modern financial remedy litigation:
- the interaction between confiscation proceedings and matrimonial finance;
- the limits of “matrimonialisation” after decree absolute; and
- the importance of full and frank disclosure when seeking interim relief such as maintenance pending suit (“MPS”) and legal services payment orders (“LSPOs”).
The Background
The applicant husband (“AGS”) sought MPS and an LSPO against the respondent wife (“RKS”) despite the fact the parties have been divorced since 2018. His case was unusual from the outset.
AGS had previously been convicted of fraud offences and was subject to a substantial confiscation order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 regime. The confiscation order identified over £1.4 million in criminal benefit and imposed a recoverable amount exceeding £500,000.
A central feature of the applicant’s case was the assertion that, despite the parties’ divorce in 2018, they had continued to live together effectively as husband and wife until 2025. On that basis, he argued that assets accumulated by RKS after the divorce should properly be treated as matrimonial property.
The respondent RKS maintained that the marriage had ended years earlier, that she had independently rebuilt her financial life, and that any post-divorce wealth was entirely non-matrimonial. She also asserted that the proceedings represented a continuation of the domestic abuse she suffered during the relationship.
The Court’s approach to Interim Relief
The judgment demonstrates the court’s increasing willingness to evaluate merits robustly at interim stage, particularly where LSPO applications are concerned.
District Judge Guirguis found that AGS faced “considerable hurdles” in advancing any substantive sharing claim. Critically, the court noted that he failed to be truthful regarding the prior Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) confiscation proceedings; and in her judgment she found that the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent by Miss Hllas KC namely that there can be no matrimonial property after decree absolute, had to be right.
The court was plainly troubled by the suggestion that assets previously utilised to satisfy a confiscation order could somehow re-emerge as matrimonial assets within family proceedings.
In one of the clearest passages of the judgment, the court held that when RKS “bought out” AGS’s interest in the former family home to satisfy the confiscation order, his interest was extinguished. To hold otherwise would effectively punish the respondent for the applicant’s criminal conduct.
The importance of Decree Absolute/ Final Order
The most significant legal point may be the court’s treatment of post-divorce cohabitation.
Counsel for the respondent argued that, once decree absolute[the final divorce order] had been granted, there could be no continuing matrimonial acquest as a matter of law. The applicant sought to characterise the relationship as having continued seamlessly despite the formal divorce.
The court ultimately accepted the respondent’s position:
“A marriage cannot be said to have continued after divorce”. Financial remedy litigation increasingly sees attempts to blur the line between post-separation cohabitation and ongoing matrimonial partnership. This judgment reaffirms that decree absolute[the final order] is not merely symbolic. Once the marriage has legally ended, the accumulation of wealth thereafter does not automatically acquire matrimonial character simply because parties remain emotionally or practically connected.
The importance of full and frank financial disclosure
The judgment is also a stark reminder that interim applications stand or fall on disclosure.
The court repeatedly criticised AGS for incomplete and misleading evidence, including:
- inaccurately describing Crown Court confiscation proceedings as a “civil POCA”;
- failing initially to disclose the outstanding confiscation liability;
- providing inadequate evidence regarding alleged business interests;
- failing to explain third-party financial support; and
- producing incomplete material concerning company income and loans.
The judge concluded that AGS had not provided “full, frank and clear disclosure”. That finding was central to the refusal of the LSPO application.
This is an important reminder that applicant’s seeking interim relief in the form of a LSPO or MPS must provide the court with a full picture of their financial circumstances. Failure to do so can lead to the application being refused.
Procedure
The court was critical of the applicant’s approach to this litigation.
The respondent successfully highlighted failures to engage meaningfully with pre-action procedure or non-court dispute resolution before proceedings were issued. While the court accepted that settlement may ultimately have been difficult, it nevertheless found the applicant’s efforts to avoid litigation “far too limited”.
Conclusion
From the respondent’s perspective, this judgment is significant because it demonstrates judicial willingness to:
- interrogate the true merits of substantive claims at interim stage;
- resist attempts to reclassify non-matrimonial property after divorce;
- recognise the practical effect of confiscation proceedings;
- scrutinise litigation funding requests carefully; and
- treat deficient disclosure as highly material to discretionary relief.
Importantly, the court refused to allow financial remedy proceedings to become a vehicle through which assets previously addressed in criminal proceedings could indirectly be revisited.
For family practitioners, the case is a valuable authority on the intersection between criminal confiscation and matrimonial finance. For respondents defending speculative or weak claims, it is an encouraging example of the court adopting a realistic and forensic approach at an early stage.
